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HERRERA v. COLLINS
113 S. Ct. 853 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Officer David Rucker, who had been fatally shot to death in the
head, was found lying beside his patrol car near Los Fresnos, Texas at
around 11:00 on the evening of September 29, 1981. At approximately
the same time that Rucker's body was found, Officer Enrique Carrisalez
pulled over a speeding vehicle in Los Fresnos. As Carrisalez ap-
proached the driver of the car, he was shot in the chest and died nine
days later.
A few days after Carrisalez's death, Leonel Torres Herrera was
arrested and charged with the capital murders of Officers Rucker and
Carrisalez. Evidence of Herrera's guilt included an eyewitness iden-
tification of Herrera as the murderer of Carrisalez, 1 and a declaration
made by Carrisalez while in the hospital identifying Herrera as the
person who shot him. Further, the speeding car that Carrisalez pulled
over was traced to Herrera's girlfriend, with whom Herrera lived, and
Officer Hernandez, Carrisalez's partner, identified the car as the one
they pulled over and the car from which the fatal shots were fired.
Herrera's Social Security card was found nearRucker's patrol car
on the night the officer was killed and blood found on Herrera's
clothing, wallet and girlfriend's car matched Rucker's blood type.
2
Evidence suggested that a hair found in Herrera's girlfriend's car was
Rucker's, not Herrera's. Police discovered a handwritten letter on
Herrera's person that implicated him in the murder of Rucker.
Herrera was found guilty in January, 1982 of the capital murder
of Officer Carrisalez and was sentenced to death. In July of 1982, he
pleaded guilty to the murder of Officer Rucker.
Herrera appealed his conviction and sentence on the grounds that
Hemandez's and Carrisalez's identifications were unreliable and
should not have been admitted against him at trial.3 The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, however, affirmed his conviction and sentence.
4
Herrera's subsequent state habeas petition and petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court were denied. 5 Herrera filed his first
federal habeas petition which was denied, 6 and the Supreme Court
again denied certiorari.
7
In his second state habeas petition, Herrera argued that he was
"actually innocent" and proffered affidavits in support of his claim.
The affidavits asserted that Herrera's now-deceased brother, Raul
Herrera, Sr., had admitted to killing the police officers. 8 The state
court denied Herrera's petition, finding that "no evidence at trial
remotely suggested that anyone other than [Leonel Herrera] commit-
ted the offense." 9 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
1 The identification was made by Carrisalez's partner, Officer
Hemandez. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. at 857 (1992).
2 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, wrote that "[t]he
blood was, like Rucker's and unlike petitioner's, type A. Blood samples
also matched Rucker's enzyme profile. Only 6% of the Nation's
population shares both Rucker's blood type and his enzyme profile."
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 872 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
3 Herrera v. State, 682 S. W. 2d 313 (1984).
4 Id.
5 Herrera v. Texas, 471 U. S. 1131 (1985).
6 Herrera v. Collins, 904 F. 2d 944 (5th Cir. 1990).
7 Herrera v. Collins, 498 U. S. 925 (1990).
8 Raul Herrera, Sr. had died in 1984.
state court 10 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.11
Herrera argued, in his second federal habeas petition filed in
1992, that because he was innocent of the capital murders of both
officers, his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. In support of his petition, Herrera offered two more affidavits
alleging that Herrera's brother was the actual murderer. Herrera also
claimed that police were aware of the evidence contained in the
affidavits and, by withholding it, the State had violated his due process
rights pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.
12
The federal district court granted Herrera's request for a stay of
execution so that Herrera could present his actual innocence claim to
the state court, but denied most of his other claims as an abuse of the
writ. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing on Herrera's
Brady claim. The federal court of appeals vacated the stay of
execution and found Herrera's Brady claim to be a "disingenuous"
attempt to have his newly discovered evidence heard. 13 The court of
appeals held that "the existence merely of newly discovered evidence
relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on
federal habeas corpus."'14 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stayed Herrera's
execution.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals,
holding that the trial is "the paramount event for determining the guilt
or innocence of the defendant." 15 Absent an independent constitu-
tional violation, newly discovered evidence is not grounds for federal
habeas relief since, in the federal habeas context, review of the
evidence is limited to evidence which is in the record. 16 A showing of
actual innocence may be a means to have an otherwise barred consti-
tutional claim heard, but it is not by itself a basis for federal relief.
17
Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence that
is found too late to meet state procedural requirements may be
remedied not through the federal courts, but through executive clem-
ency.18 The Court assumed arguendo that executing a petitioner with
a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence is unconstitu-
tional if a state does not allow a claim of innocence to be redressed
through such avenues as executive clemency. 1
9
9 ExparteHerrera, No. 81-CR-672-C (Tex. 197th Jud. Dist., Jan.
14, 1991).
10 Exparte Herrera, 819 S. W. 2d 528 (1991).
11 Herrera v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
12 373 U. S. 83 (1963).
13 Herrera v. Collins, 954 F. 2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992).
14 Id. at 1034.
15 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869.
16 Id. at 860.
17 Id. at 862-863.
18 Id. at 866.
19 Id. at 869.
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ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Court agreed that it would be unconstitutional to punish a
person for a crime he did not commit since the purpose of our"criminal
justice system is to convict the guilty and free the innocent. '20 The
Court noted, however, that Herrera's showing of innocence must be
considered in light of the previous proceedings and the fact that the
evidence produced to support his claim was produced not at trial, but
eight years later.
The Court began its reasoning by noting constitutional provisions
that protect innocent persons from being convicted. For example, a
person charged with a crime is presumed innocent and the state must
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2 1 In capital cases, the
Constitution requires additional protections not afforded to those
charged with a non-capital crime.22 But once a defendant is found
guilty, the presumption of innocence disappears and thus, the Court
wrote, Herrera "does not come before the Court as one who is
'innocent,' but on the contrary as one who has been convicted by due
process of lav of two brutal murders.
'23
Herrera argued that the affidavits established his innocence
notwithstanding the verdict at trial.24 Herrera further claimed that
"the federal habeas court should have 'an important initial opportunity
to hear the evidence and resolve the merits of Petitioner's claim.'
25
The Court interpreted Herrera's argument as requiring the federal
court to hear testimony of trial witnesses and of witnesses relevant to
the newly discovered evidence and then to re-determine whether or not
the petitioner was guilty of the crime of which he was convicted.
However, because Herrera failed to state an underlying constitutional
violation that occurred during the trial as a basis for why the newly
discovered evidence was not heard, the Court held that he could not
seek federal habeas corpus relief.
26
The Court reasoned that the purpose of federal courts, in the
context of habeas corpus petitions, is to guarantee that individuals are
not held in prison in violation of the Constitution.27 Federal courts are
not expected to re-examine or reweigh evidence relevant to the guilt
of the petitioner; evidence presented to a federal court on habeas must
be relevant to the constitutionality of the petitioner's detention.
28
Were federal courts to begin to hear solely evidence of guilt or
innocence absent any constitutional violation, the majority feared that
the federal system would be completely disrupted. 29
20 Id. at 859 (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230
(1975)).
21 Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
22 Id. at 860 (citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980)).
23 Id.
24 The Court noted that Herrera could not argue the claim in state
court because he did not meet Texas' required 30-day deadline for filing
a motion for a new trial. Id.
25 Id. at 861 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 42).
26 Id. at 860 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
27 Id. (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923)).
28 Id. (citing Townsend v. Sahm, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
29 Id. at 861.
30 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (holding that federal habeas courts may ask
whether trial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt).




35 To successfully claim "actual innocence" at the federal level, a
habeas petitioner must show that a constitutional violation has probably
Jackson v. Virginia,30 the Court suggested, "comes as close to
authorizing evidentiary review of a state court conviction on federal
habeas as any of our cases."'31 However, the Court distinguished
Jackson from the instant claim, reasoning that Jackson allows inquiry
only into whether there has been a constitutional violation of the
Winship standard requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
32
Further, Jackson permits the federal court to review only the record
evidence.
33
Federal habeas corpus relief usually takes the form of a condi-
tional order of release. This type of relief would normally require that
the State retry the petitioner, which in Herrera's case would be ten
years after the crime was committed. The passage of time, the Court
argued, at best would make the guilt/innocence determination no more
exact than the first trial and, in fact, probably more unreliable.
34
Claims of "actual innocence ' 35 may enable petitioners who
normally would be barred from seeking federal habeas relief because
of successive petitions or abuse of the writ to obtain federal habeas
relief. However, in such a situation, a claim of "actual innocence' is
not itself the basis of relief, but is merely a "gateway through which a
habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional
claim considered on the merits. '36 The Court wrote that "free-
standing claims of actual innocence" have no forum in the federal
habeas context.
37
The Court also rejected Herrera's claim that his showing of actual
innocence entitled him to a new trial as a matter of due process.38 The
Court noted that it historically has deferred to state legislatures'
judgments in the area of criminal procedure and had found state
criminal procedure wanting "only where it 'offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."' ' 39 That Texas required motions for new
trials to be filed within 30 days of the petitioner's conviction and
refused to hear Herrera's claim of actual innocence eight years later
did not violate principles of fundamental fairness, the Court held.
40
The Court summarily dismissed Herrera's more limited argu-
ment that he should not necessarily receive a new trial but that the
federal habeas court should be able to vacate his death sentence,
pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if
he were able to show actual innocence. The Court reasoned that if
Herrera were truly innocent of the underlying crime, "[i]t would be a
rather strangejurisprudence.., which held that under our Constitution
resulted in the conviction of one who is innocent of the crime of which
he was convicted. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). One
convicted of capital murder may successfully argue that he is "innocent
of death" by showing "based on the evidence proffered pius all record
evidence, a fair probability that a rational trier of fact would have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to the existence of those facts which are
prerequisites under state or federal law for the imposition of the death
penalty." Sawyerv. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514,2523 (1992). See also case
summary of Sawyer, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992).
36 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862. ,
37 Id. at 862-63. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun wrote
that "having held that a prisoner who is incarcerated in violation of the
Constitution must show he is actually innocent to obtain relief, the
majority would now hold that a prisoner who is actually innocent must
show a constitutional violation to obtain relief. The only principle that
would appear to reconcile these two positions is the principle that habeas
relief should be denied whenever possible." Id. at 880-81 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
38 Id. at 864.
39 Id. (quoting Medina v. California 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992)
(quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977))).
40 Id. at 866.
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he could not be executed, but that he could spend the rest of his life in
prison."4 1
Although it rejected all of Herrera's claims for judicial relief, the
Court suggested that Herrera still had a "forum to raise his actual
innocence claim" by seeking executive clemency from the governor of
Texas.42 Describing executive clemency as the "'fail safe' in our
criminal justice system,"'43 the Court stated that "recent authority
confirms that over the past century clemency has been exercised
frequently in capital cases in which demonstrations of 'actual inno-
cence' have been made."
'44
Had Texas had no executive clemency provision or other "fail
safe" for petitioners sentenced to death, the Court assumed "for the
sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant
federal habeas relief ....,-45 However, the showing in such a situation
would have to be extraordinarily high due to the need for finality in
capital cases. Herrera's showing, the Court found, fell "far short" of
this high threshold, especially since it was based upon affidavits,
which the majority stated are often used to abuse new trial motions
because no credibility determinations may be made through cross
examination.
46
In Virginia, motions for new trials based on newly discovered
evidence are "addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, are
not looked upon with favor, are considered with special care and
caution, and are awarded with great reluctance" 47 since the judiciary
views such motions as fraught with the opportunity and motive for
fraud.48 The moving party must establish that the proffered evidence
was discovered after trial, that the evidence could not have been
acquired by the movant through reasonable diligence before trial, that
it is not simply cumulative, corroborative, or collateral, and that the
evidence is material in that it should produce opposite results on the
merits at a second trial.49 Therefore, the standard imposed upon the
Virginia defendant who moves for a new trial is difficult to meet.
41 Id. at 863.
42 In Texas, the petitioner, the petitioner's representative, or the
Governor may request that the Board of Pardons and Paroles grant
clemency. Tex. Admin. Code Tit. 37, § 143.1 (West Supp. 1992). A full
pardon, a commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment or
other penalty, or a reprieve from execution may be requested in capital
cases. Tex. Admin. Code Tit. 37, § 143.1 and § 143.57. The Govemorhas
sole authority to grant one reprieve not exceeding 30 days in any capital
case. Tex. Admin. Code Tit. 37, §141.41(a).
The Board of Pardons and Paroles will review applications for
a full pardon when it receives: "(1) a written unanimous recommendation
of the current trial officials of the court of conviction; and/or (2) a
certified order orjudgment of a court having jurisdiction accompanied by
certified copy of the findings of fact (if any); and (3) affidavits of
witnesses upon which the finding of innocence is based." Tex. Admin.
Code Tit. 37, § 143.2.
43 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 868 (citing K. Moore, Pardons: Justice,
Mercy, and the Public Interest 131 (1989)).
44 Id. at 868 (citing M. Radelet, H. Bedau, & C. Putnam, In Spite
of Innocence 282-356 (1992)). In contrast, Justice Blackmun, dissent-
ing, wrote that the Court, in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986),
"explicitly rejected the argument that executive clemency was adequate
to vindicate the Eighth Amendment right not to be executed if one is
insane. [citation omitted] The possibility of executive clemency 'exists
in every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence under the
Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare possibility would make
judicial review under the Eighth Amendment meaningless."' Id. at 881
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983)).
45 Id. at 869.
46 Id. The Court found Herrera's affidavits dubious because of
several inconsistencies among them. That the affidavits were filed at
"thp 11 th hn,,r" innl nfte~r the- l nP.m11- rtnrnf th. minrmie wnt rind
However, Justice White, concurring in the judgment of Herrera,
wrote that: "To be entitled to relief.., petitioner would at the very least
be required to show that based on proffered newly discovered evidence
and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, 'no rational
trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'
50
Justice White's standard suggests that the petitioner who can show that
he is not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt may be granted an evidentiary
hearing despite the state procedural bars against the claim.
The likelihood that a defendant will receive clemency from the
Governor of Virginia is slim. In Virginia, the Governor has the power
to commute capital punishment 5 1 and to grant pardons and reprieves.
52
Only two death row inmates have had their sentences commuted in
Virginia since 1972:53 Joseph Giarratano and Herbert Bassette, Jr.
(both by Governor L. Douglas Wilder).
54
Because the chances of the Virginia trial court granting a
defendant's motion for a new trial based on new evidence or of the
Governor's granting clemency are small, Herrera's holding re-em-
phasizes the importance of "federalizing" the issues in capital cases.
Since free-standing claims of actual innocence (i.e. those based on no
federal issue) have no place in the federal forum, it is crucial that
defense counsel make motions and objections on federal constitu-
tional grounds beginning pre-trial. Appellate and habeas counsel also
will want to explore ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims as a
possible means of providing a constitutional basis for the consider-
ation of newly discovered evidence which otherwise would be barred.
Foremost, however, Herrera drives home the need for trial counsel to
engage in a thorough investigation before trial ofall possible evidentiary
sources, because once a conviction and death sentence are secured, it
will be extremely difficult to have any new evidence that comes to
light entertained in a judicial forum.
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles
was also highly questionable to the Court as was the fact that Herrera
pleaded guilty to one of the murders. In light of the evidence presented
at Herrera's trial, the newly discovered evidence before the Court did not
outweigh the strong proof of guilt at the trial level.
Justice Blackmun noted, however, in his dissent, that "[iut is
common to rely on affidavits at the preliminary-consideration stage of a
habeas proceeding. The opportunity for cross-examination and credibil-
ity determinations comes at the hearing, assuming that the petitioner is
entitled to one. It makes no sense for this Court to impugn the reliability
of petitioner's evidence on the ground its credibility has not been tested
when the reason its credibility has not been tested is that petitioner's
habeas proceeding has been truncated by the Court of Appeals and now
this Court." Id. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47 Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123,130,301 S.E.2d 145,149
(1983) (citing Lewis v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 602, 608, 166 S.E.2d
248, 253 (1969)).
48 Whittington v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 212,220,361 S.E.2d
449, 454 (1987) (citing Lewis v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 612, 625, 70
S.E.2d 293, 301 (1952)).
49 Whittington, 5 Va. App. at 220, 361 S.E.2d at 454; Payne v.
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460,472, 357 S.E.2d 500, 507 (1987); Odum
v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983).
50 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring) (quoting
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).
51 Va. Code Ann. §53.1-230 (1992).
52 Va. Code Ann. §53.1-229 (1992). The Virginia Parole Board's
role in the clemency process appears to be merely investigatory. Va.
Code Ann. §53.1-231 (1992).
53 Cf.Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding thatcapital
punishment, as then administered, was unconstitutional).
54 See e.g., Harris, Va. Death Sentence Commuted; Wilder Cites
Doubts About Inmate's Guilt. W. Post. Jan. 23. 1992. at Dl.
